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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on institutional theory and discursive psychology, this article elucidates how actors use 
emotion discourse to undermine the legitimacy of consumer practices. Based on an empirical 
investigation of the bullfighting controversy in Spain, our work shows how activists engage in 
the production and circulation of compelling emotional prototypes of their adversaries. Such 
emotional prototypes constitute the discursive foundations of a pathic stigma, which, once 
established, taints the identity of the social groups associated with the practice. Our work frames 
the centrality of pathic stigmatization as a cultural mechanism mediating the relationship 
between emotion discourse and the subsequent delegitimization of consumer practices. We make 
three key contributions to the literature: we advance a rhetorical perspective on emotions and 
their role in deinstitutionalization processes; we further develop the theory of marketplace 
sentiments by showing how sentiments operate downstream; and we provide evidence of the 
sociocultural mechanisms underpinning the emotional vilification, stereotyping and 
stigmatization of consumer collectives.  
 
Keywords: legitimacy contests, delegitimization, stigmatization, emotion discourse, sentiments, 
rhetorical analysis 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The pluriverse of values shaping the fabric of contemporary consumer societies is 
inextricably linked with the possibility of disagreements and conflicts over the legitimacy of 
consumer practices. By implication, marketplace legitimacy is widely regarded as a fragile, 
temporary accomplishment, which is subject to contestation and change (Giesler 2008; 
Humphreys 2010a, b). The actors partaking in marketplace controversies tend to anathematize 
their opponents by drawing a divide between the villains – they – and heroes or victims – us 
(Giesler 2008; Gopaldas 2014). For example, countercultural communities moralize their 
position by drawing a stark contrast between themselves and a stereotyped selfish, materialistic, 
and gullible “mainstream consumer” (Kozinets and Handelman 2004); local coffee aficionados 
legitimize their anticorporate views through disparaging depictions of politically and morally 
apathetic Starbucks customers (Thompson and Arsel 2004); Hummer owners are exposed to 
morally reproving messages highlighting their responsibility for climate change, dangerous 
driving, or military interventions and conflicts over oil resources (Luedicke, Thompson, and 
Giesler 2010); and music downloaders legitimize their activities through the creation of 
marketplace dramas wherein they appear as morally superior characters fighting against greedy, 
totalitarian, and culturally alienating record companies (Giesler 2008).  
Therefore, the earlier work demonstrates that delegitimization entails adversarial relations 
between marketplace actors, which tend to be accompanied by judgements concerning the moral 
and social worth of rivals. Complementing this observation, Gopaldas (2014) shows that 
marketplace ideologies cultivate not only potent moral meanings but also powerful sentiments of 
“contempt for villains”.  
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To date, however, these processes have been primarily studied at the macro-level, leaving 
aside questions about the way in which broad emotional categories operate downstream as the 
actors engage with specific political and moral issues. More specifically, we argue that there is a 
limited understanding of how marketplace actors are categorized as villains based on the 
emotions and feelings ascribed to them and the broader structuring effects that these emotional 
categorizations may have on markets. A close reading of participant quotes in the previous 
research concerning marketplace controversies (Giesler 2008; Kozinets and Handelman 2004; 
Luedicke et al., 2010; Thompson and Arsel 2004) suggests that although the attribution of 
emotions and feelings to rival actors is a common feature of adversarial discourses, analysts tend 
to gloss over these issues, treating them as part of the general discursive background for other 
phenomena under study.  
In this article, we consider the role of emotions as a crucial mechanism whereby 
marketplace constituents are categorized as villains, as well as the implications for the 
delegitimization of consumer practices. To this end, we turn towards the extant literature on 
emotions developed at the intersection of neo-institutional theory (Brown, Ainsworth, and Grant 
2012) and discursive psychology (Edwards 1999). These literatures are widely based on a view 
of emotions as rhetorically oriented, discursive categories, which are deployed by actors to 
perform social actions in institutional contexts (Edwards 1997, 1999; Potter 1996; Potter and 
Wetherell 1987).  
Specifically, our research draws on the notion of emotion discourse (Edwards 1997, 
1999), a discursive form of emotion work that is integral to the collective processes of moral 
reasoning through which institutions are created, maintained and disrupted (Brown et al. 2012; 
Moisander, Hirsto and Fahy 2016; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). Through an empirical 
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examination of the current debate on bullfighting in Spain, we show how antibullfighting 
activists (challengers) mobilize emotion discourse to articulate the following compelling 
emotional prototypes of their adversaries (custodians of the practice): the Psychopath, the Bully, 
and the Savage. Such social categories are rendered possible by four performative functions of 
emotion discourse, namely, labelling, stereotyping, demarcating and discrediting, leading to the 
establishment of a pathic stigma. Once established, the pathic stigmatization of supporters serves 
to undermine the normative and relational legitimacy of the practice.  
This article theorizes the role of emotion discourse as a structuring mechanism in 
delegitimization processes, which may operate alongside other cultural processes identified in 
the literature, including marketplace sentiments (Gopaldas 2014), semiotic shifts (Humphreys 
2012a), moralistic work (Luedicke et al. 2010), or the creation of dramas (Giesler 2008). We, 
thus, pave the way for an integrative account of delegitimization that avoids a spurious 
separation between emotion discourse, marketplace sentiments, and shifting moral meanings.  
Specifically, our work makes three key contributions to the literature. First, this research 
advances our understanding of the emotion-based mechanisms through which market actors 
negotiate and ascribe membership to antagonistic social categories (e.g., heroes vs. villains), 
particularly in the course of legitimacy contests. As argued above, although earlier studies 
indicate that actors often attempt to disparage their opponents, relatively little attention has 
hitherto been paid to the specific role of emotions in these processes. Our research addresses this 
limitation by foregrounding how activists buttress their negative moral judgments through the 
production of rhetorically compelling emotional prototypes of their adversaries.  
Linked with this, we incorporate an emotion-based explanation of stigma within the 
context of cultural consumer research. Whilst the extant work has centered on the relation 
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between stigma and moral meanings (Sandikci and Ger 2009), we draw attention to the 
fundamental role of emotion discourse in the process of stigmatization. Particularly, our work 
contributes by explicating how a variety of negative emotional dispositions, feelings or levels of 
emotional competence are selectively invoked and ascribed – via emotion discourse – to portray 
the villains as morally deviant or inferior (Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt 2005; Lutz 1996; Rezende 
2008). These critical arguments highlight the need for consumer researchers to adopt a more 
reflexive stance towards emotion-based accounts of marketplace controversies, remaining 
vigilant to the ways in which the actors’ emotional rhetoric might contribute to stigmatizing their 
adversaries and foster the appearance of uncivil, bigoted and intolerant behavior towards them. 
Second, based on the above, our work articulates the notion of pathic stigma as a cultural 
mechanism mediating the relationship between activists’ mobilization of emotions in situated 
discourse and the subsequent delegitimization of consumer practices. Similar to other culturally-
oriented theorizations of market change (e.g., Giesler and Thompson 2016), these processes are 
recursively intertwined, affecting one another in nonlinear and context-dependent ways – rather 
than involving linear cause-effect relations. Therefore, whilst the implications of pathic stigma 
for delegitimization are primarily concerned with the erosion of normative and relational 
legitimacy, we defend that there are spillover effects on other legitimacy pillars. In this regard, 
we demonstrate that the ability of a consumer practice to generate positive relational outcomes 
(e.g., self-worth, social identity, status, or dignity) (Sandikci and Ger 2009) can be undermined 
by systematically ascribing members of a social collective with negative emotional 
characteristics, which are subsequently aligned with various forms of moral deviance. We further 
argue that this loss of moral and relational legitimacy, in turn, disrupts other legitimacy pillars, 
including the regulatory and cognitive ones. Therefore, our research expands the current 
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understandings of delegitimization in the cultural consumer research by illuminating the ways in 
which emotion-laden discourse lubricates marketplace controversies and contributes to the 
demise of the targeted consumer practices and their legitimacy.  
Third, our work contributes by further expanding the literature on emotions in the context 
of cultural consumer research, particularly with reference to the theory of marketplace 
sentiments. This theory has established the role of sentiments at the macro-level (Gopaldas 2014) 
by conceptualizing emotions as broad cultural dispositions that structure marketplace action. 
Comparatively, however, limited attention has been paid to the study of “emotions in action”, 
thus hindering our understanding of how broad marketplace sentiments operate downstream. 
Indeed, while the analysis of marketplace sentiments has hitherto prioritized “empathetic, 
nonjudgmental, and validating conversations that permit consumers to express their feelings” 
(Gopaldas 2014, 1011), we have adopted a different analytical stance that allows the unveiling of 
the strategic and rhetorical uses of emotions, as well as their performative nature, which are 
particularly relevant in the context of public debate and strategic argumentation (Edwards 1999; 
Moisander et al. 2016). More specifically, we develop an action-oriented account of emotion 
discourse to study marketplace sentiments “in the making”, rather than as ready-made entities. 
We also highlight the benefits of suspending our assumptions about how actors “really” feel, 
focusing instead on the ways in which they mobilize emotion discourse in naturally occurring 
interactions. This approach is particularly valuable insofar as it contributes to elucidate the 
mechanisms mediating between the situated forms of emotion discourse and the broader 
structuring role of marketplace sentiments argued in the work of Gopaldas (2014).  
 
EMOTION WORK, EMOTION DISCOURSE AND DELEGITIMIZATION 
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The work of Gopaldas (2014) is based on the idea that marketplace actors are not passive 
recipients for sentiments. On the contrary, consumers, corporations, activists or NGOs are 
capable of consciously generating and utilizing emotions to further their causes. This link 
between marketplace sentiments and strategic agency resonates with recent developments in 
institutional theory. The latter starts from the premise that institutions “are ‘inhabited’ by people 
and their doings” (Hallett and Ventresca 2006, 215), and thus, institutional change/stability 
should be studied as a collective outcome of the institutional work carried out by actors at the 
micro-level (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Lecca 2011). This agentic view of actors as “institutional 
entrepreneurs” is widely shared amongst the culturally-oriented consumer research scholars, 
(e.g., Scaraboto and Fischer 2012), whose insights have proven particularly valuable in framing 
the notion of institutional work as a suitable unit of analysis for studying delegitimization 
processes. 
Amongst the different types of institutional work, our article specifically focuses on 
emotion work. We identify two approaches to emotion work in institutional theory. One such 
approach has focused on emotion work as a nexus between actors and institutional orders, 
represented by a set of culturally prescribed feeling rules (Hochschild 1979; Creed, Hudson, 
Okhuysen and Smith-Crowe 2004). From this perspective, emotion work encapsulates 
individuals’ efforts to manage their feelings as they seek to enact prescribed forms of actorhood 
within a given institutional regime (Hochschild 1979; Jacobsson and Lindblom 2013; Voronov 
and Weber 2016).  
A second strand of the emotion work literature has advanced the idea of emotion 
discourse (Moisander et al. 2016; Toubiana and Zietsma 2017), focusing on the crucial role of 
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emotion-oriented rhetoric in “the production of influential texts that change the discourses on 
which institutions depend” (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004, 648). From this perspective, 
actors are skillful rhetoricians capable of strategically endowing institutional discourses with 
emotionally oriented rhetoric to persuade others about the legitimacy of their views (Brown et al. 
2012). This research shows that, for example, actors typically rely on emotion-based arguments 
to resolve disputes concerning the legitimacy of institutional change (Suddaby and Greenwood 
2005); incorporate emotional content within institutional frames (Jasper 2011; Voronov and 
Vince 2012); or use discourse to promote specific emotions that neutralize resistance (Moisander 
et al. 2016; Toubiana and Zietsma 2017).  
Most significant for our purposes, emotion discourse has been argued to contribute to the 
social categorization of individuals and collectives (Billig 2002). Social categorization 
judgments depend on cultural exemplars and ideal prototypes, which embody the main 
characteristics used to define and demarcate the boundaries between different social groups 
(Hogg and Terry 2000). Actors can use emotion discourse to create and mobilize specific 
emotional prototypes, which allows them to differentiate between social groups based on their 
allegedly distinct emotional characteristics. For example, binary gender categories have 
traditionally relied on discourses depicting ideals of hyper-emotional womanhood versus hypo-
emotional manhood (Heesacker et al. 1999; Plant, Hyde, Keltner and Devine 2000), and the 
construction of national stereotypes involves emotional prototypes, such as the emotional 
Brazilian (Rezende 2008). It is in this sense that emotion discourse operates as a mechanism for, 
inter alia, the creation of “emotional roles” (Parkinson 1996), “emotional stereotyping” (Mackie, 
Devos, and Smith 2000; Mackie, Smith, and Rey 2008), or even “emotional self-stereotyping” 
(Menges and Kilduff 2015).  
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A corollary to these arguments is that assigning social groups with distinct emotions, 
feelings, and affective states is decisive in the formation and consolidation of social categories, 
as well as the validation of moral judgments concerning actors and their practices. These 
arguments beg the question of how the categorization of adversaries through emotion discourse 
contributes to delegitimizing a practice. Legitimacy is a multidimensional construct comprising 
three pillars, namely, normative, cognitive and regulatory (Suchman 1995). The normative 
legitimacy of a practice is compromised when it becomes incongruent with the dominant moral 
norms and values (Kates 2004). A practice has attained cognitive legitimacy when it is taken for 
granted (Humphreys 2010b). So, actors can affect cognitive legitimacy by problematizing the 
alignment between a practice and the existing cognitive schemas (Humphreys and Latour 2013). 
Finally, changes in government rules and regulations can be enacted to undermine the regulatory 
legitimacy of the practice (Humphreys 2010b, 492). More recently, legitimacy scholars have 
foregrounded a fourth pillar, namely relational legitimacy, which arises when a practice “is 
perceived to affirm the social identity and self-worth of individuals or social groups, or to ensure 
that social groups are treated with dignity and respect” (Tost 2011, 693-694). Relational 
legitimacy is pivotal for our study insofar as this pillar comprises the various aspects of 
collective identity and social status upon which the continuation of a given consumer practice, in 
this case bullfighting, is justified.  
Given these arguments, our framework allows for the identification of three axioms to 
analyze the role of emotion discourse in delegitimization processes. First, we argue that emotion 
discourse shall be primarily framed as a strategically oriented, discursive activity, for “emotions 
do not exist as wordless impulses, lying beneath social life, but are constituted within social, 
discursive interaction” (Billig 2002, 179). Adopting this perspective implies that “no clear 
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distinction is drawn between emotion ‘discourse’ and emotions ‘themselves’” (Edwards 1999, 
179), and thus, analysts are encouraged to suspend their assumptions regarding what actors really 
feel. Instead, they should direct their attention to “emotions in use” and the different rhetorical 
functions performed by emotion-oriented accounts of events, experiences, or people (Edwards 
1997, 173). Consequently, emotional prototypes shall not be conceptualized as checklists made 
of a fixed set of emotional attributes, but rather should be approached as “fuzzy sets” (Hogg and 
Terry 2000, 123) that allow for rhetorical flexibility and discursive variability (Edwards 1999; 
Potter and Wetherell 1987).  
Second, emotion discourse is central to social categorization processes (Billig 2002). 
Different social categories are established by selectively attributing – or denying – actors with 
different emotional dispositions, feelings, or levels of emotional competence (Hopkins et al. 
2005; Lutz 1996; Rezende 2008). Consistent with our first axiom, a wide range of rhetorical 
resources can be used by actors to perform such emotional characterizations in the context of 
situated discourse (Edwards 1999; Potter and Wetherell 1987). The power of emotional 
prototypes to validate/undermine social categories lies in the prevalent cultural view of 
emotional life as offering a privileged window into an individual's’ true self and inner nature 
(Lupton 1998). In other words, feelings and emotions are culturally perceived as being 
“generated from within the self” (Lupton 1998, 63), and as such, they are widely used by actors 
as reliable cues to infer someone’s true intentions, character or personality.  
Finally, our framework draws attention to the links between emotion discourse and 
(i)legitimacy. The categorization of actors-as-villains demands their construction as transgressors 
of normative and cultural expectations, with the subsequent loss of a positive group identity and 
social status. In other words, we argue that the vilification of the social groups most closely 
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associated with a practice contributes to delegitimizing the latter by directly undermining its 
normative and relational legitimacy. This argument does not imply that other pillars of 
legitimacy (e.g., cognitive or regulatory) cannot be affected by the vilification of actors via 
emotion discourse. On the contrary, the previous research shows that the different legitimacy 
pillars typically interrelate and operate in conjunction with one another (Humphreys 2010a, b; 
Humphreys and Latour 2013).  
 
BULLFIGHTING: A CONSUMPTION PRACTICE IN DECLINE 
 
Bullfighting constitutes a tradition in which the utilization of bulls serves an array of 
symbolic purposes, emerging as a rich cultural tapestry that is colored by identity, fantasy, 
recreation, and drama (Mitchell 1991). In Spain, Douglass (1999) notes the existence of multiple 
bullfighting contests with a myriad of regional variations. Bullfighting is integrated into 
contemporary consumer culture, having been referred to by Pink (1997, 198) as a “big business” 
which “participates as such in the market economy". Indeed, the symbolism of bullfighting has 
been widely used for nation branding purposes, turning the consumption of bullfighting into a 
widely recognized and distinct tourist attraction (Cohen 2014). Despite its seemingly enduring 
significance, bullfighting represents a consumer tradition in decline. Government data suggest 
that the number of bullfighting events in Spain has fallen by a sharp 24% relative to 2011 
(SMECS 2016). However, the research depicts a divided public opinion, with highly polarized 
views dominating the debate (María et al. 2017; SMECS 2016).  
The debate concerning bullfighting in Spain is affected by changes in the broader 
“context of contexts” within which the consumption of bullfighting is embedded (Askegaard and 
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Linnet 2011), namely, as follows: the rise of peripheral nationalisms and the contestation of the 
Spanish national identity; the cultural and political integration of Spain in the European Union; 
and the rise of animal rights movements and concern with animal welfare.  
First, the institutionalization of bullfighting in Spain has played a key historical role in 
the configuration of a distinct national identity (Brandes 2009; Douglass 1999; Mitchel 1991). 
The growth of nationalist sentiments in different parts of Spain, particularly within the Basque 
and Catalan regions (Douglass 1999), and the rise of separatist movements in these regions, has 
involved a rejection of many of the symbols traditionally associated with the Spanish national 
identity, including bullfighting (Perales and Thouverez 2014).  
Second, some authors have related the demise of bullfighting in Spain to interlinked 
cultural processes of Europeanization and modernization (Brandes 2009; Douglass 1999). 
According to critics, the transformation of Spanish society by the forces of modernity was both 
late and insufficient (Ortega y Gasset 2015). Consequently, Spaniards have historically struggled 
to legitimize their position amongst Western European nations such as France, Britain or 
Germany (Bailey 2007; Douglass 1999). From this perspective, the continuation of bullfighting 
in Spain has become associated with the country’s alleged failure to integrate itself within a 
modern Western European civilization – which is deemed as superior (Bailey 2007). Therefore, 
although Spain became a full member of the European Union in 1986, bullfighting is often 
depicted as an anachronistic cultural residue hindering progress towards a Pan-European project 
that is widely supported, especially amongst younger generations of Spaniards (Brandes 2009; 
Douglass 1999). 
Finally, bullfighting is affected by changing attitudes towards animal cruelty and the 
growth of the animal rights movement. Bullfighting is an activity in which witnesses are 
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confronted with scenes of explicit violence, blood, and viscerae, and where animal suffering 
manifests itself in forms that are both blunt and crude. This integral aspect of bullfighting does 
not chime well with changing societal values and sensitivities towards animals (Franklin 1999). 
In Spain, concerns relating to animal welfare have grown quickly and substantially (María et al. 
2017), particularly among the young (Díaz-Carmona 2012). A myriad of groups (e.g., 
Greenpeace, Ecologistas en Acción, or PETA) and individuals have been campaigning against 
bullfighting since the 1980s. The work of PACMA, the Animal Rights Political Party, has been 
crucial in agglutinating the antibullfighting sentiment and articulating it in political terms. In 
fact, antibullfighting campaigns have been at the center of PACMA’s activism and discourse 
since 2003, with various symbolic victories in the process.  
Arguably, one of the most significant victories for antibullfighting campaigners in Spain 
was the ban of the Toro de la Vega in 2016, which constitutes the context of this research. The 
Toro de la Vega (henceforth TdV) was a local bullfighting contest of medieval origin that used to 
take place in Tordesillas, a small town in the autonomous region of Castilla y León (Pitt-Rivers 
2002). Every second Tuesday of September, crowds would gather behind fences as a bull was 
solemnly brought to the town center of Tordesillas. The arrival of the bull was awaited by 
hundreds of local men bearing traditional spears of approximately eight to ten feet in length. 
Once the bull was ceremonially released, a frantic pursuit on foot and horseback began. 
Contenders chased the running bull across an open field, and the first man to hunt down the 
exhausted animal would spear it to death. Once the bull had been killed, the testicles and tail of 
the animal were removed and awarded as a prize for the winner – who would typically exhibit 
these prizes pinned to the killing spear. 
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The public controversy concerning TdV spans the period of 2014-2016. Prior to 2014, 
protests against the TdV maintained a rather low-profile in terms of media coverage, as they 
were primarily confined to the local level without having any wider political repercussions. One 
reason for this is that, historically, bullfighting has been deeply rooted in this region of Spain 
(Diario de Sesiones Parliament of Castilla y León, 8/06/2016, 2927). Bullfighting’s cultural 
embeddedness was legally reasserted in 2014, when the regional parliament of Castilla y León, 
with a conservative majority, passed a bill granting bullfighting the status of “Immaterial 
Cultural Heritage” (BOE no. 18 2014). The latter bestowed bullfighting events with special legal 
protections and privileges to ensure their preservation within this Spanish region. Critics across 
the country were angered by this decision, with antibullfighting protests escalating rapidly into a 
series of violent riots and clashes between TdV advocates and activists. Dramatic scenes of 
violence and tension flooded the media and the TdV controversy suddenly became the focal 
point of a broader national debate concerning the legitimacy of bullfighting as a whole (El País 
14/9/2016).  
This debate culminated in 2016, when the regional parliament passed a bill that banned 
the killing or injuring of bulls in public sight (El Huffington Post 16/09/2016; El Norte de 
Castilla 16/08/2016). TdV supporters received these changes not only as a de facto termination 
of their tradition but also, most importantly, as representing the beginning of the end for 
bullfighting’s legitimacy across the country (El País 12/09/2016). This bill was legislated and 
passed by the same conservative party that, two years earlier, declared bullfighting a form of 
cultural heritage. In fact, at the time of writing, the ban remains in place and further regulatory 
changes affecting the status of bullfighting contests in different parts of the country are being 
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debated by other regional parliaments (e.g., Balearic Islands). The web appendix A provides a 
detailed chronology of the events.  
 
METHOD 
 
We chose to examine emotion discourse in the context of digital participatory media, as 
they have been proven to be fundamental arenas for legitimacy contests (Hoefer and Green 
2016). In contemporary digital media, the distinction between news-producers and news-
consumers blur (Manosevitch and Walker 2010), as audiences exchange arguments in a process 
of co-production, interpretation, and formation of legitimacy judgements (Hoefer and Green 
2016).  
Data collection begins with the “precipitating event” (Giesler and Thompson 2016) – in 
this case, the first violent clashes on September 16th 2014 – and ends with the postcontroversy 
status quo – in this case, the first Toro de la Peña celebration following the TdV ban on 
September 13th 2016. The digital news reports were retrieved using Factiva, whereas different 
blog search engines (Blogsearching and Searchblogspot) were employed to collect blog-related 
contents within this timeframe. The keywords included in our search were “Toro de la Vega” and 
“bullfighting”. This data set comprises journalistic discourses (n=3,644) and audiences’ 
discourses – deployed in blogs and the comment sections of both media and blogs (n=7,949) 
(table 1). This data corpus was supplemented with the analysis of the minutes of the TdV 
discussion sessions held at the regional parliament between 2014 and 2016 (n=3), as well as the 
bill issued by the Regional Parliament regarding the ban of the festival (BOCL no. 96 2016).  
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Insert table 1 about here 
 
The analysis followed the basic tenets of emotion discourse analysis (Edwards 1997, 
1999; Potter 1996; Potter and Wetherell 1987), focusing on the “rhetorical design and use of 
emotion categories” (Edwards 1999, 273) to vilify TdV supporters through the construction of 
different emotional prototypes. Drawing on Edwards (1999), it is important to clarify that the 
scope of the emotion discourse is not limited to the explicit use of words such as anger, fear, 
surprise, and so on; rather, emotion discourse encompasses a rich set of figures of speech, where 
emotion related words may or may not be present (e.g., the boiling metaphor for anger). Equally, 
emotion discourse is multimodal and it includes images (Kress 2013). Given the nature of 
emotion discourse as a rhetorical social practice that can take on a myriad of subtle and implicit 
forms, the task of quantifying the frequency of emotion words or their intensity (as per in content 
and sentiment analysis) becomes problematic (Humphreys and Wang 2017; Potter 1996). 
All the data were compiled and shared by members of the research team. The analytical 
strategy was emergent, involving several iterations of individual analysis and group discussions, 
during which the individual codes were cross-checked and refined.  
The first part of the analysis focused on the audiences’ discourse (classified as 
challengers or supporters, hereafter). We privileged the study of the audiences’ discourse 
because the mobilization of emotion discourse is freer here than in other contexts (Brown et al. 
2012). Furthermore, examining these micro-interactions allows researchers to examine the 
emotion discourse unfolding in naturally occurring conversations (Edwards 1999; Potter 1996).  
Here, we identified the prototypes applying the two principles of emotion discourse 
analysis (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 168), namely, variability and consistency. First, we 
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searched for patterns in the data in the form of both variability – different in the content or form 
of accounts – and consistency – the identification of features shared by accounts. We searched 
for the specific patterns of speech and the shared emotional repertoires constituting such 
prototypes. This initial analysis showed that the challengers constructed the villain differently 
and this variability is explained by the delineation of three main prototypes. There are 
similarities among them, namely aggressiveness, cruelty and enjoyment of suffering. Yet, these 
features are accounted for differently by the challengers; on the basis of these differences, the 
three prototypes emerge. The three prototypes are labelled using the emic terms employed by the 
challengers in their comments. Consistent with an action-oriented, performative understanding of 
discourse (Potter 1996), we suspended our assumptions regarding whether the emotion discourse 
is reflective of the actors’ real feelings towards TdV supporters, focusing instead on how 
emotion categories “are invoked and what kinds of discursive work such invocations perform” 
(Edwards 1999, 279).   
Once the three prototypes were scoped and articulated, we turned our attention to the 
rhetorical devices used for their construction. We first identified the granular-level rhetorical 
devices (figures of speech, compiled in web appendix B), which were subsequently grouped into 
four broad rhetorical strategies. In the second stage, we focused on the journalists’ and 
regulators’ discourses to examine whether the prototypes were reproduced and then coded the 
rhetorical devices used for this reproduction.  
 
FINDINGS 
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The following sections present the findings in two different stages. We first explain how 
the challengers’ emotion discourse enables the social categorization of supporters as 
Psychopaths, Bullies or Savages. Second, we discuss the rhetorical strategies used for this 
categorization. Jointly, these rhetorical strategies perform four functions that serve to construct 
the TdV supporters as villains. Next, we explain how the journalistic and regulators’ discourse 
reproduce and validate these prototypes, which cements a pathic stigma of TdV supporters 
(figure 1).  
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
Emotional Prototypes: the Psychopath, the Bully and the Savage 
 
The use of emotion discourse enables the challengers to build three main emotional 
prototypes of TdV supporters, namely, the Emotionally Shallow Psychopath, the Cowardly Bully 
and the Irrational Savage.  
 
The Emotionally Shallow Psychopath. The challengers’ discourse draws upon an 
emotional repertoire closely associated with cultural depictions of serial killers and psychopaths, 
namely, the idea of emotionally cold, calm, calculative characters who are capable of committing 
atrocities without feeling guilt, remorse, or empathy for their victims. TdV supporters allegedly 
derive pleasure from the torment and killing of a bull because they lack the ability to experience 
moral emotions such as empathy, remorse or compassion – “You have no shame… You don’t 
understand the word ‘compassion’” (comments to a blog entry on 16/09/2015). The challengers 
tend to overemphasize the agonistic aspects of bullfighting, which is commonly referred to as a 
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“carnage”, while selectively diverting attention from any other potential motive or purpose, such 
as aesthetic, tradition or community.  
Typically, these comments draw on hyperboles and equivalences between the TdV and a 
range of evil acts, such as “murder”, “torture”, “genocide” (comments to a news post on 
14/09/2016), “crime” (comment to a blog post on 9/04/2015), or even the “Nazi Holocaust” 
(comment to a news post on 14/09/2016). Such discursive associations serve the challengers by 
reframing the expression of positive emotions towards bullfighting (e.g., joy, admiration or 
pride) and utilizing them as evidence of the custodian’s general inability to feel empathy, pity or 
compassion. Consequently, a villain prototype is established by depicting TdV supporters as 
psychopaths – emotionally shallow and “cold hearted people” (comments to a blog post on 
1/09/2016) – who behave cruelly and sadistically due to the absence of moral emotions.  
 
The Cowardly Bully. Emotion discourse is also used to construct bullfighting supporters 
as frustrated, weak, emotionally insecure men that act as bullies. In Spain, bullfighting has been 
culturally endowed with positive emotions such as braveness, toughness, courage or virility, 
which are encoded within traditional masculine roles (Lutz 1996). Contrary to the latter, the 
challengers portray TdV supporters as a group of “pathetic insecure men” (comment to a blog 
post on 1/09/2016), who need to assert their masculinity by harming the weak and vulnerable – 
“we’ve had enough with their brutality to show how machos they are!!” (comment to a news post 
on 14/09/2016). TdV advocates are also compared to domestic abusers and ‘wife beaters’ – 
“don’t tell these guys [custodians] that hitting their wives has been made illegal. They'll get upset 
when they find out” (comment to a blog post on 5/2016). Furthermore, the challengers’ 
foreground feelings of shame, anger and resentment arise from their purported inability to 
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sexually perform or “satisfy their women” (“Their wives cheat on them with anyone because 
they had enough of their pub-like bullshit, so they just pick on a defenseless being to pay for 
their frustrations” (comment to a news post on 13/09/2015). Therefore, whereas the Psychopath 
prototype emphasized the absence of moral emotions, the Cowardly Bully ascribes TdV 
supporters with feelings of shame, resentment and inferiority arising from an allegedly 
unaccomplished sense of masculinity. 
 
The Irrational Savage. As noted by Elias (1982), the civilizing process was accompanied 
with ever higher expectations of self-regulation and emotional restraint encoded in the form of 
good manners and social status. Contrary to this view, the Irrational Savage prototype depicts 
TdV supporters as feral, animal-like individuals who are incapable of exerting emotional self-
restraint due to either their inferior intelligence, or their lack of education and proper manners.  
The challengers characterize bullfighting as an act of blind rage – rather than an act of 
evil – and subsequently, those who support it are reduced to a mob of angry, uncontrolled and 
low-class men. The latter are typically compared with Neanderthals and beasts in terms of their 
emotional development, as the following quote exemplifies: “[it] is beyond me how in the 21st 
century someone can act like a Neanderthal” (comment to a news post on 13/09/2016). Similarly, 
comments refer to TdV advocates as “animals” (comment to a blog post on 04/06/2016), “pack 
of hounds” or “steers” (comments to news posts on 16/09/2014).  
The challengers also emphasize the supporters’ intellectual and cultural inferiority with 
the use of terms such as “mentally retarded” (comment to a news post on 9/9/2016), “stupid and 
uneducated” (comment to a news post on 15/09/2015), “illiterate” (comment to a news post on 
13/09/2016), “uneducated villagers” (comment to a news post on 16/09/2014) and “provincials” 
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(blog entry on 13/09/2016). Therefore, TdV supporters are villainized by an alleged inability to 
control their emotional urges, basic emotions and aggressive instincts, which not only indicates a 
flawed emotional and moral character but also their inferior cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984). 
 
Rhetorical strategies in challengers’ emotion discourse 
 
Pairings and Metaphors. Challengers use metaphors to rhetorically associate – or pair up 
– TdV supporters with other culturally embedded social categories, such as “killers” (comment 
to a blog post on 13/09/2015), “sadists” (comment to a blog post on 21/08/2015), or “animals” 
(comment to a blog post on 04/06/2016). These categories, external to the domain of 
bullfighting, are already established as morally repulsive, evil or inferior. The use of the 
metaphor offers an efficient resource for prototype delineation; it avoids detailed elaborations 
and argumentations on the part of the challengers and implies that the emotions and moral 
evaluations associated with villains are more easily pulled and transferred to their adversaries 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999).  
The pulled metaphors are thematically related to the extent that they ascribe supporters 
with a relatively coherent set of emotions and feelings that are typically associated with villains, 
such as hyper-aggressiveness, absence of moral and social emotions (e.g., empathy, remorse, 
guilt or shame), and sadism (e.g., deriving pleasure from inflicting pain on a sentient being). 
Despite their internal coherence, however, these metaphors also provide the challengers with 
great rhetorical flexibility, as they can be applied to a wide range of behavioral instances and 
exemplars related to the practice of bullfighting.  
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Contrasts. To amplify the emotional deviance of the villain, the challengers resort to 
contrasts to focus on the emotional differences between the villains and the victims/heroes. First, 
the challengers rhetorically augment the suffering and victimization of the bull. Counteracting 
the traditional depictions of the bull as a feral beast, the bull is anthropomorphized and portrayed 
as a defenseless and peaceful being with feelings and emotions. The challengers praise the 
beauty and bravery of the bull and highlight its innocence, vulnerability and ultimately 
submissive attitude towards a cruel death. To do so, they use a set of figures of speech, such as 
eulogy, elegy, enargeia, prosopopoeia and similes (web appendix B). Through these figures of 
speech, the challengers intend to show that feelings of empathy, compassion and pity should be 
the rational and reasonable reactions towards the bull. The fact that the supporters do not show 
these emotions is argued as further proof of their emotional deviance.  
Second, the challengers mobilize hyperbolic testimonies of their own feelings to highlight 
a contrast between their superior emotional sensibility, on the one hand, and the absence of 
emotions among TdV supporters, on the other. The challengers often provide detailed 
descriptions of their own emotions, including, for example, vivid expressions of empathy and 
compassion towards the bull, their joy and pride about taking part in “the good fight” (blog entry 
on 21/08/2015), or their sadness, shame and guilt for not being able “to do more” to stop the 
practice (comment to a blog post on 21/08/2015).  
In addition to the use of emotional differences, the challengers use contrasts to establish a 
divide between themselves and the supporters on the basis of the latter’s allegedly inferior 
cultural capital. For instance, the challengers exaggerate their use of formal language when they 
interact with supporters, with the intention of making a point about their cultural inferiority. In 
the thread of comments to a news article published in the national newspaper El País 
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(16/09/2014), a supporter of TdV says the following: “They [bulls] do not suffer, do not 
experience pain, they do not complain, they simply fight and die, it is a good type of death but 
you [challengers] will never understand”. A challenger responds as follows: “How can you 
defend this barbarian argument that a bull does not suffer when stabbed? Could anyone be more 
ignorant and mendacious?” In his response, the commenter responds by using the formal use of 
“you” in Spanish (i.e., “usted”), using correct punctuation and quotation marks, often ignored 
when writing in social media, and choosing a formal word, seldom used in informal 
conversations (“mendacious”). With these resources, his construction of the supporter as 
“Savage” is more plausible. 
 
Selective Descriptions and Attributions. The challengers’ comments tend to describe 
bullfighting supporters in ways that selectively focus on events or instances of behavior that 
confirm their emotional prototypes, whilst simultaneously omitting any information that could 
provide a more nuanced emotional portrait of the actors involved. The challengers’ accounts of 
violence tend to be one-directional. They frequently draw attention to aggressive behaviors or 
language used by TdV supporters, while violence amongst antibullfighting activists typically is 
systematically omitted, denied, or rationalized (“No animalist has ever used violence to defend 
their ideas”, comment to a blog post on 1/12/2015). To be certain, violence is not confined to the 
TdV supporters. In fact, both antibullfighting activists and TdV supporters have demonstrably 
employed physical violence to confront one another during demonstrations (El Mundo 
17/09/2014), and the use of hate language on social media is bidirectional – as attested by the 
sheer volume of comments in which the challengers wish TdV supporters slow, painful deaths 
often by using imprecations and anathema (“When you get to eat Rompesuelas [name of the 
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bull] in the stew I hope he gives you deadly diarrhea … that no doctor in the world can remove 
his bones from your ass” (comment to a blog post on 11/09/2015). Nevertheless, when other 
commenters point to the fact that antibullfighting activists can also act aggressively or violently, 
the challengers tend to reframe such behaviors as acts of self-defense, isolated incidents, or even 
as morally justified and rational responses. For example, consider the following comment: 
Usually those who do not respect animals, cannot respect people (...) I was there and I 
only saw people yelling at us because we protested against their festival, but I already 
said that some animalists may have misbehaved and I don’t like it either. (Comment to a 
news post on 13/09/2016). 
This comment illustrates how support for bullfighting is used as evidence of a generalized lack 
of empathy (not only for animals but also for people) amongst TdV supporters, while at the same 
time, the aggressive behaviors by antibullfighting activists are downplayed (“they misbehaved”) 
and presented as an exception (“some animalists”) that does not represent the speaker as a 
challenger (“and I don’t like it”). The key point here is that, through selective descriptions, 
violence perpetrated by the challengers is depicted as minimal, unusual and morally justified, 
whereas the supporters’ acts of violence, anger or blind rage are generalized and presented as 
common behaviors that demonstrate their alleged emotional flaws, e.g., their lack of empathy or 
inability to control their emotions.  
 
Semantic Reversals. With this strategy, challengers select a central concept used by 
custodians to defend their position and reverse its meaning. This resignification is then invoked 
by challengers as further proof of the emotional deviance of supporters and is clearly seen in the 
semantic reversal of “medieval” and “culture”. The TdV supporters base their defense of the 
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festival on its being a 400-year old tradition. The supporters usually refer to it as “our medieval 
tradition” to emphasize that the festival is part of their cultural heritage and should be protected. 
Using irony, the challengers invert this meaning of “medieval” by invoking the negative 
connotations of the word, namely, it being “dark”, “brutish”, and “uncivilized”. For instance, a 
commenter uses irony to say the following: “As these are medieval traditions, in Tordesillas they 
should start burning witches, legalize slavery, etc. The stones [reference to the stones thrown at 
animalists] are used to recreate the “medieval” atmosphere” (comment to a news post 
16/09/2014). By establishing the semantic reversal of “medieval”, the challengers implicitly 
suggest that only deranged or primitive individuals could defend a “medieval” tradition. 
Similarly, the supporters defend the festival for its being an expression of “culture”, with the 
intended meaning of a folk tradition, worthy of respect. The challengers resignify “culture” as 
“reason” or “civilization” and depict TdV as similar to other discontinued practices that were 
incongruent with a “civilized” society. For instance, they compare TdV to other “cultural” 
expressions considered untenable today, such as the droits de seigneur (comment to a news post 
on 16/09/2014). The fact that supporters defend the TdV as “culture” is argued as evidence of 
their being “unreasonable” and “uncivilized”.   
 
The Performative Functions of the Challengers’ Emotion Discourse 
 
We have framed emotion discourse as a form of social action through which actors 
perform institutional work in the context of strategic debate and public argumentation – rather 
than a medium to express their inner feelings (Billig 2002; Edwards 1997). Thus, while a 
traditional approach would treat emotion-based discourse as an outcome of either individual 
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feelings or collective sentiments, a performative orientation seeks to elucidate what the actors 
accomplish when they use emotion discourse rhetorically in the course of a controversy.  
The rhetorical strategies found in the challenger’s discourse jointly perform the following 
four functions (Link and Phelan 2001): labelling, stereotyping, demarcating and discrediting. 
Labelling concerns the use of discourse to impart emotions onto other actors, emphasizing either 
aspects of hyper-emotionality, namely, the idea of the supporters’ behavior as being governed by 
passions and strong emotions rather than reason (“They are aroused by seeing the bull die”, 
comment to a blog post on 4/06/2016), or hypo-emotionality – to explain the TdV supporters’ 
behavior in terms of a limited or impaired capacity to experience emotions (“You don’t have a 
heart”, comment to a blog post on 16/09/2015).  
Stereotyping involves a generalization of emotional characteristics – based on individual 
cases – to entire collectives. As shown above, the challengers’ emotion discourse seldom focuses 
on one single individual or event, but rather, they tend to direct attention to the allegedly shared 
and collective nature of a particular emotion or affective state. The third function is demarcating, 
which denotes the use of emotion discourse to establish inter-group differences and contrasts 
between the emotionally deviant and culturally inferior “them” and the emotionally appropriate 
and civilized “us”.  
Finally, the fourth function of emotion discourse is discrediting. The challengers discredit 
the supporters by pairing them with other social categories already established as inferior, or by 
stripping out the meaning structures (e.g., protection of cultural heritage) on which the TdV 
supporter would build their positive distinctiveness as a group (Tajfel and Turner 1985). The 
construction of supporters as emotionally deviant provides a rationale and a justification for the 
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rejection and exclusion conveyed, notably, in the imprecations and the anathema (web appendix 
B).  
 
Reproduction and Validation of the Emotional Prototypes  
 
Having considered the work of the challengers as skillful rhetoricians, who use emotion 
discourse to prototype the TdV supporters as villains, a question remains with regards to how 
these prototypes are socially reproduced and diffused beyond micro-level interactions. The 
previous accounts of legitimacy have forcefully demonstrated that the media and regulators are 
not passive vessels of meanings; rather, they actively contribute to the semiotic shifts 
(Humphreys, 2010a, b) underpinning the construal of legitimacy judgments (Brown et al. 2012; 
Humphreys and Latour 2013; Moisander et al. 2016; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Building on 
this, our analysis moves beyond the micro-level interactions amongst media users to show that 
the emotional prototypes also circulate within the discourse of both journalists and regulators.   
Here, it is important to consider that “emotionality typically represents a decline in the 
standards of journalism and a deviance from journalism's proper social role” (Pantti 2010, 170). 
Therefore, an explicit usage of emotion discourse by journalists can contravene the extant 
conventions governing the production of journalistic discourse. Despite this barrier, emotional 
prototypes effectively infiltrated the journalistic discourse and circulated within the coverage of 
the TdV controversy, which was accomplished through various rhetorical moves, most notably 
the utilization of direct quotes by journalists. By using direct quotes from antibullfighting 
activists (in the headlines or through the story) and combining these with a more factual style of 
reporting the events, journalists were able to reproduce verbatim some of the crudest emotional 
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prototypes of the TdV supporters without overtly breaching conventions of factual reporting. 
Direct quotes from the challengers included, for example, explicit references to the TdV as 
“murder” (El Correo 14/09/2016) and the participants as “killers” (Europa Press 7/9/2014),  
“ruthless murderers” (Diario de León 14/09/2014) or “savages and inhuman” (Euronews 
13/09/2016). 
Moreover, the use of emotion discourse was also evident in opinion columns, where, 
contrary to regular newspaper articles, the conventions of factual reporting tend to be more 
relaxed and authors are typically freer to employ emotionally-laden language. For example, 
various columnists defined TdV as an expression of “sadism” and “cruelty” (ABC Seville 
19/09/2014; Editorial El País 17/09/2014) or even more explicitly, they labelled the festival as a 
“social psychopathy” (El País 9/9/2014). In another example, a columnist stated the following: 
“TdV is an attack to our intelligence and to our deepest human condition capable of feeling piety 
and empathy” (El Sur 18/09/2014). Depictions of participants carrying the stuffed head of a bull 
reinforce the aforementioned prototypes by implying that they are psychopaths who keep 
souvenirs of their victims (Agence France Presse 13th/09/2016). The portrayal of supporters as 
Bullies is stabilized when columnists speak of the TdV as a festival of “cowards” (La Opinión de 
Málaga 30/07/2016) or when the tournament is described as a “lynching” perpetrated by a mob 
(El Periódico de Extremadura 16/09/2016). Finally, in numerous instances, columnists 
characterize supporters as Savages, by referring to them as “uncivilized yokels” (Diario de León 
28/09/2016) or “redneck brutish” (Diario de Mallorca 14/10/2014).  
In addition to journalists, regulators also contribute to reproducing the emotional 
prototypes of TdV supporters. The minutes of the parliamentary sessions in which the TdV ban 
was discussed demonstrate that regulators also depict TdV supporters a violent, sadistic, 
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uncivilized and primitive collective. For instance, the TdV is explicitly labelled as “torture” by a 
liberal party representative (Izquierda Unida representative, Diario de Sesiones Parliament of 
Castilla y León no. 35, 2931-2932). The representative of another liberal party (Podemos) 
defends the ban by arguing that the “savage” and “sadistic enjoyment” the festival represents 
cannot be accepted. Moreover, in his allocution, this representative uses the already described 
rhetorical strategies of semantic reversals and contrasts almost verbatim (Podemos 
representative, 2934-2935). Even the governing (conservative) party defends the ban of TdV for 
its lack of fit with “modern Spain” (2928).  
In addition to reproducing the emotional prototypes, the analysis of the media and 
regulators’ discourse shows that they also contribute to their validation. Here, validation refers to 
the rhetorical creation of a sense of social consensus around a particular legitimacy judgment 
(Bitektine and Haack 2015). The existence of a general consensus against bullfighting is a highly 
contentious issue, with most opinion polls and surveys typically indicating a rather ambivalent 
position amongst Spaniards (María et al. 2017; SMEC 2016). However, the discourse of 
journalists and regulators frequently invoked a purported national consensus encompassing not 
only a rejection of bullfighting but also the negative prototypes allegedly associated with the 
taste for this practice.  
Two rhetorical strategies create the impression of social consensus in media discourse. 
The first is the reproduction of quotes from high-status figures explicitly positioned against the 
TdV. For example, Pedro Sánchez, the current Prime Minister and leader of the Socialist Party at 
that time, explained in an interview that he was “ashamed of the TdV” (Infolibre 10/09/2015). 
Other examples include judges (El Mundo 26/09/2016), celebrities (EfeVerde 16/08/2014; Εl 
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Periódico de Catalunya 14/09/2015), popular TV presenters (Diario de León 26/09/2016; The 
Huffington Post 16/09/2014), or sportsmen and women (El Mundo 14/09/2016).  
A second strategy to create a sense of consensus is to appeal to, and speak on behalf of 
“the majority”, “the Spanish society”, or “the people” when making the case for the ban of TdV 
(Europa Press 14/09/2016). An impression of unanimity is most acutely conveyed in headlines 
such as “Spain ratifies the TdV ban” (Deutsche Welle 14/12/2016). Although the article refers to 
the decision of the Supreme court against the city council’s appellate procedure regarding the 
ban of the TdV, the sinecdoque conveys the idea that all Spaniards support the ban.  
Similarly, the regulators’ discourse contributes to staging an impression of social 
consensus around the prototypes. During the parliamentary sessions (Diario de Sesiones no. 35 
2016), the conservative ruling party defended the ban out of a need “to adjust the festival to the 
(…) contemporary social demands; what was morally acceptable hundreds of years ago, it is not 
acceptable today” (2928). This is also reflected in the wording of the bill, which justifies the ban 
as a legitimate response to “a persistent and growing social will” against the TdV and the need to 
regulate “without delay, the celebration of popular and traditional shows in line with the ethical 
demands of today's society” (BOCL no. 96 2016). With this, the ruling party accepts that the 
challengers’ view is dominant in Spain and, therefore, the regional government should attend to 
their demands.  
 
The Creation of Pathic Stigma  
 
As the emotional prototypes of the supporters are reproduced and validated by the media 
and regulators, a pathic stigma is gradually cemented and develops into an accepted cultural 
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marker of social undesirability and inferior status (Devers et al. 2009). Goffman (1963, 3) 
defines stigma as a deeply discrediting attribute that reduces the bearer “from a whole and usual 
person to a tainted, discounted one”. Building on this, we use the term pathic stigma1 to denote a 
set of emotional characteristics, discursively constructed and rhetorically attributed to actors, 
which signals some fundamental flaw in their moral character (their vilification).   
Emotional prototypes taint the TdV supporters by linking their group-identity with 
various forms of so-called “emotion dirt” (MacMurray and Ward 2014, 1134), namely “taboos 
and misplaced feelings (...) that threaten the solidarity, self-conception or preferred orders of a 
given individual or community”. In response to these associations, TdV supporters frequently 
complain that their position is “degraded” and “shamed” (blog entry on 08/2016), “insulted and 
scorned” (comment to a news post on 14/09/2016), defeated and “trampled over” (comment to a 
news post on 14/09/2016), “derided” (comment to a news post on 13/09/2016), marginalized, 
prosecuted, or even “lynched” (comment to a news post on 13/09/2016). The scope of this 
vilification is extensive, encompassing the whole town of Tordesillas, with residents reporting 
that living in Tordesillas became tantamount with being a “yokel” and a “sadist” (blog entry on 
08/2016). The following comment illustrates this point: 
It is a real shame that Tordesillas has become infamous across Europe for its brutality 
against the bulls and no-one remembers the archived treasures (heritage) preserved there. 
(Comment to a news post on 13/09/2016). 
Pathic stigmatization is, therefore, the most significant performative effect of emotional 
prototyping and has wider social implications. The pathic stigma becomes cemented due to intra-
discursive (i.e., the rhetorical flexibility and illocutionary force of the emotion discourse) and 
 
1  Pathic is used here as the adjectival form of the Greek noun pathos (páθos), meaning "suffering, emotions or feelings". Source: 
Etymonline.com  
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extra-discursive factors (i.e., its reproduction by high power actors). We have already explained 
how the reproduction of the emotional prototypes by high power actors validates the vilification. 
We elaborate more on the intra-discursive factors below. 
As we have shown, emotional prototyping encompasses a rich variety of emotional 
depictions, some of which may be overlapping, whilst others are digressing (TdV supporters are 
categorized as feeling too much – “Savages” – or feeling too little – “Psychopaths”). Either way, 
the supporters are said to feel “deviant emotions”, depending on what specific prototype suited 
the discursive context. Here, the rhetorical flexibility of the emotion discourse is pivotal to 
neutralize the supporters’ defensive work, particularly insofar as any attempts at resisting 
stigmatization can be used by challengers to confirm and further reinforce the emotional 
prototypes. For example, if supporters react with sadness at the loss of their tradition, then 
challengers would use these reactions as proof of their cultural and intellectual inferiority, as 
well as their inability to manage their emotions, act rationally and embrace modernity (thereby 
confirming them as irrational savages). Alternatively, if the supporters respond with anger, such 
reactions would be used to confirm their portrayal as emotionally frustrated bullies. Finally, 
when TdV supporters show indifference or aloofness towards the challengers’ attacks, this is 
typically used as evidence of their alleged inability to feel or express any emotions (which 
confirms the Psychopath prototype). Therefore, there is limited room for TdV supporters to 
disprove the emotional prototypes because the latter’s plasticity allows challengers to constantly 
rework and adjust them to a wide range of emotional responses and defensive work carried out 
by their adversaries. An excessive emphasis on coherence and rigidity could make emotional 
prototypes vulnerable to a myriad of counterexamples and exceptions and could call their 
validity into question. 
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In addition to the rhetorical flexibility, the illocutionary force of the emotion discourse 
contributes to cement the pathic stigma. The intertextual relationship with broader cultural 
narratives (Oliver 1992) facilitates the cognitive acceptance of the prototypes (Suchman 1995). 
For instance, the rhetorical and discursive possibilities afforded by the Savage prototype are 
reinforced by their connection with broader views concerning the modernization of Spain and its 
integration in the European Union (Bailey 2007); similarly, the construction of bullfighters as 
Psychopaths or Bullies is facilitated by the changing views on animal welfare within the country 
and abroad (Douglass 1999). Moreover, the emotional prototypes are rhetorically aligned with 
existing semiotic structures (Humphreys 2010b), in this case, other social categories from the 
broader cultural imaginary of “deviance” and “evilness” (e.g., Nazis, wife-beaters, bullies, or 
yokels). This congruence with semiotic structures and identities that are already vilified is 
important because it facilitates the cognitive acceptance of the pathic stigma by endowing the 
latter with a sense of “taken-for-grantedness”.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study has articulated emotion discourse as a form of emotion work. Additionally, it has 
shown the utilization of emotion discourse for the construction of villains. Its rhetorical 
flexibility and performativity render emotion discourse as an effective device for social 
categorization. Second, this study has unveiled the role of pathic stigmatization as a mediating 
cultural process for the delegitimization of consumer practices. In the next section, we explain 
the implications of our research for three key conversations in the cultural consumer research. 
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The key conversations revolve around a) marketplace sentiments, b) the delegitimization of 
consumer practices, and c) the study of marketplace controversies.  
 
Towards a Rhetoric and Performative Approach to Marketplace Sentiments 
 
The pioneering work of Gopaldas (2014) reclaims the study of sentiments as socio-
cultural constructs, paving the way for further theorizations concerning how emotions shape 
controversies over consumption practices, products and identities. This author identifies three 
broad sentiments commonly associated with marketplace actors, namely, contempt for villains, 
concern for victims, and celebration of heroes, which operate primarily at the macro level 
(Gopaldas 2014). In comparison, our work engages with the downstream implications of 
marketplace sentiments, providing a conceptual framework that illuminates how emotions are 
brought to bear at the meso and micro levels of marketplace controversies. Three implications of 
our proposed framework are brought forward.  
First, we emphasize that the rhetorical function of emotions cannot be discounted from 
the analysis of marketplace sentiments, nor can we assume a direct correspondence between 
actors’ emotions and their discourse. Indeed, as we move away from the macro levels of inquiry, 
we observe that the rhetorical and performative dimensions of emotions acquire greater 
relevance. This observation problematizes the assumption of a direct correspondence between 
the actors’ emotional accounts and their actual feelings. In other words, the actors’ accounts of 
emotions cannot be treated as signposts to their emotional states without problems arising.  
Drawing on discursive psychology, our proposed methodological move is to suspend the 
distinction between emotions, on the one hand, and discourse, on the other. By implication, the 
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task of the analyst is to bring to the foreground the ways in which actors’ construct what is 
culturally recognized as “sentiments”, as well as the functions that such discursive constructions 
perform in the context of market controversies. One such key function of emotion discourse 
involves the social categorization of other marketplace actors based on their alleged emotional 
qualities. In this regard, we show how multiple emotional characteristics can be strategically 
ascribed to rivals to categorize them as villains, without necessarily assuming that they reflect 
their true feelings.  
Second, we believe that emotional dispositions towards actors may not be as clearly 
demarcated and linearly attributed as the extant literature suggests. The fluid and open-ended 
emotional constructions of the villain suggest that the range of emotions potentially displayed 
towards them could be more numerous than the three sentiments originally argued. Our research 
suggests that the actors may intend to elicit a broader range of emotions towards villains, 
including anxiety and fear towards the Psychopath, contempt towards the Bully, or pity and 
disdain towards the Savages. Presumably, this argument could be extended to the emotional 
construction of heroes and victims in marketplace controversies, albeit this observation would 
fall beyond our empirical remit. Given these arguments, our study warns against taken for 
granted understandings of “sentiments” as ready-made, superordinate categories characterized by 
a high degree of semantic coherence and internal structure. Our study also highlights the 
difficulty in seeking to establish permanent, universal, one-dimensional links between a 
particular emotion and a marketplace actor.  
Our work serves to advance a significantly more fluid perspective on the relationship 
between actors and marketplace sentiments. The actors’ emotion discourse may temporarily 
accomplish a high degree of actor/sentiment coherence by associating different emotional 
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prototypes with existing semiotic structures and broader cultural narratives, as identified by 
Gopaldas (2014). However, given that actor/sentiment coherence is ultimately contingent on the 
rhetorical work of the actors, we posit that the links and associations between the market 
constituents and specific sentiments are always ‘in the making’ – and thus, open to change and 
contestation. The latter become increasingly apparent as marketplace sentiments are moved 
downstream from the macro to the micro and meso-levels.  
Third, we defend the idea that emotion discourse precedes the formation of sentiments. 
Within the extant literature, sentiments are defined as shared emotional dispositions towards 
(already existing) marketplace actors, be they villains, actors or heroes (Gopaldas 2014, 998). 
This view, which is also held by neo-institutional theorists (Brown et al. 2012; Moisander et al. 
2016), passes in silence over the prior role of emotions in the construction of the marketplace 
actors towards whom such sentiments are elicited. We address this gap by establishing that the 
actors must be socially categorized as villains before sentiments of contempt can be mobilized 
against them, as suggested by Gopaldas (2014). Emotion discourse plays a pivotal role in such 
processes of actor construction, emotional prototyping and categorization.  
Beyond contributing to the study of emotions in the cultural consumer research, our work 
seeks to initiate a productive conversation with the literatures on emotional stereotyping and 
intergroup emotions (Mackie et al. 2000; Mackie et al. 2008). Despite agreeing with their view 
of emotions as social mechanisms that regulate inter-group relations as they unfold within 
already existing group boundaries, our work also highlights that emotion discourse precedes the 
very formation of groups. In this regard, we suggest that it is rather limiting to assume that 
groups exist prior to the emotions that their members allegedly feel both within them and 
towards other groups. In fact, our work points to the need for interrogating the emotion discourse 
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practices through which group identities are built, managed, resisted and neutralized, and how 
the latter may gradually give rise to group boundaries and intra-group emotional processes.   
 
Emotion Discourse, Pathic Stigmatization and its Implications for Delegitimization 
 
Our theorization of emotion work provides an innovative analytical framework for 
studying delegitimization processes, alongside other forms of ideological, moralistic and 
semiotic work. The extant literature indicates that actors seek to legitimize their positions by 
mobilizing antagonistic ideological constructions (Kozinets and Handelman 2004), dramatic 
frames and narratives (Giesler 2008), cultural capital/taste distinction (Thompson and Arsel 
2004), or moralistic discourses (Luedike et al. 2010). Our work is based on the idea that emotion 
discourse is another form of institutional work deployed to affect the illegitimacy of a consumer 
practice. More specifically, we have demonstrated that the mobilization of emotion discourse 
ultimately leads to the creation of a pathic stigma.  
We conceptualize pathic stigmatization as a cultural mechanism mediating the 
relationship between activists’ mobilization of emotions in situated discourse and the subsequent 
delegitimization of consumer practices. With the establishment of the pathic stigma, the 
normative and relational bases that sustained the legitimacy of TdV were undermined. The 
construction of supporters as being emotionally deviant contributed to the perception that they 
are unfit to or incapable of respecting the prosocial logic on which normative legitimacy is 
grounded (Suchman 1995). Normative legitimacy is eroded by presenting TdV supporters as 
violators of moral principles, such as the care for life or the protection of victims. 
Simultaneously, the portrayal of the supporters as morally deviant undermines their social status 
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and – if we credit supporters – even their dignity. The relational legitimacy of the practice is 
eroded, as the ability of the actors to derive a collective sense of identity and belonging, 
solidarity and status from their participation in the practice is undermined by the establishment of 
negative emotional associations.  
In summary, the pathic stigmatization of the supporters construes the members of the 
group as violators of social norms and unworthy of social respect. Their vilification further 
justifies calling for extreme punishments and retributions on the challengers’ side. In this regard, 
the challengers argue that TdV supporters deserve to be verbally abused, shamed and repudiated 
by society. More extreme cases explicitly justify the use of physical violence or imprisonment, to 
list some of the punishments conveyed in the imprecations and anathema (web appendix B). 
Whether these are real or feigned, such verbalizations contribute to higher levels of incivility in 
social media interactions by turning the targeted group into a subhuman category (Haslam and 
Loughnam 2014). 
Various spillover effects followed from the loss of the TdV’s normative and relational 
legitimacy, the most significant of which impinged upon the cognitive and regulatory legitimacy 
of the practice. We have argued that, traditionally, bullfighting operated as “a generator of 
cultural specificity” (Mitchell 1991, 410) and a core element of Spanish national identity 
(Brandes 2009). However, with TdV being recast as backwards, sadistic, and uncivilized, the 
practice became incongruent with new cultural schemes concerning the integration of Spain in 
the European Union and its place alongside other modern European democracies.  
The vilification of TdV supporters also affected the regulatory legitimacy of the practice. 
Indeed, as the public endorsement of pro-bullfighting groups became tantamount to a public 
endorsement of psychopaths, bullies, and savages, their cause lost the traditional support of the 
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main political parties in the country. Proof of this rapid change is that the 2016 ban of TdV was 
issued and implemented by the same government that had endowed bullfighting with special 
legal protections (as a form of local cultural heritage) in 2014. Therefore, even though the effects 
of emotion discourse manifested most directly on the TdV’s normative and relational legitimacy, 
all the legitimacy pillars sustaining the practice were directly or indirectly undermined.  
Hence, whereas the previous work underscores the centrality of normative, cognitive and 
regulatory legitimacy in market making (Humphreys 2010a, b), our work contributes by 
foregrounding how the latter are closely intertwined with relational legitimacy. The TdV lost its 
legitimacy when participation/advocacy of this practice was no longer perceived as contributing 
to a positive group identity or self-worth for individuals; on the contrary, it became a reason for 
shame, social derision and exclusion, which in turn, impinged upon other legitimacy pillars. 
Indeed, previous consumer studies (Kates 2004; Sandikci and Ger 2009; Scaraboto and Fischer 
2012) have discussed how marginalized consumers strive to gain relational legitimacy in markets 
by constituting themselves as socially worthy so that they “receive the outcomes commensurate 
with such entitlement” (Tost 2011, 694). Given our focus on delegitimization, our study shows a 
different process, namely, how actors are constructed as deviant, deprived of social worth so that 
their practices are shunned and excluded from the market.  
 
On the Centrality of Actor-Vilification via Emotion Discourse and its Implications for the Study 
of Consumer Controversies 
 
While the previous work has argued that consumer controversies unfold as sagas “of 
heroes, villains and victims” (Giesler 2008, 739), it is apparent that villains are placed firmly at 
42 
 
 
the center of this process. Villains function as a catalyst for consumer activism (Gopaldas 2014); 
they focus blame, provide a clear target for collective action, and solidify adversarial group 
identities (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). In this regard, Anker concludes that “without a villain, 
there is no victim and thus no hero or heroic feat” (Anker 2005, 26).  Despite villains being at the 
center of marketplace controversies, the rhetorical and discursive mechanisms whereby 
marketplace villains are constructed have hitherto received scant attention.  
Our work addresses this limitation and contributes to our understanding of how the 
process of actor vilification occurs. A corollary for future analyses of marketplace controversies 
is that the latter should become more attentive to the connection between the rhetoric of actor-
vilification and its implications for the targeted collective. More specifically, there is a risk that 
this approach, somewhat unwittingly, makes researchers less sensitive to the relations between 
the emotions that are attributed to an actor and the success/failure of that actor’s cause. For 
instance, Kozinets and Handelman (2004) showed that mainstream consumers are portrayed by 
activists simultaneously as “emotionless” (“robotic sleepers” and “couch potatoes”, 702) and as 
primal, emotion-driven individuals who are unable to control their impulses for buying an ever-
increasing number of commodities (700). Traces of emotion discourse also pervade 
representations of commercial organizations, such as large record companies (Giesler 2008), 
wherein executives and managers are depicted by their opponents as emotionally frustrated, 
impotent bullies (“What a pathetic expression of impotence is it to sue children, you know, 
children? Or caring mums or folks who don’t even have a computer”, 747), as well as 
unempathetic, calculative, and cold-hearted men (“... when the man’s million-zillion dollar teen 
slut might not make him the moolah he wants, they shut the shop up”, 746). 
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Our research demonstrates that emotion discourse is key to reinforcing activists’ moral 
judgements concerning other marketplace constituents. As rival actors are strategically endowed 
with emotional states, feelings and dispositions, their subsequent vilification becomes 
increasingly plausible. In extreme cases, however, the negative emotional prototypes that are 
culturally validated by high-power actors, including academics, may consolidate into a pathic 
stigma, which allows latent forms of bigotry, intolerance and prejudice towards the targeted 
collectives to surface. Therefore, even though a close inspection of the previous work 
corroborates our point that actors regularly depict their adversaries in emotional terms, it also 
emphasized the dangers of treating emotion discourse unproblematically, particularly insofar as 
this may foster an unproductive complicity in the emotional categorization and potential 
caricaturing of certain marketplace constituents. To avert these concerns, our work advances a 
rhetorical and performative perspective that encourages a more reflexive consideration of the 
role of emotion discourse alongside other forms of ideological, moralistic and semiotic work, 
such as ideological constructions (Kozinets and Handelman 2004), dramatic frames and 
narratives (Giesler 2008) or myth-based identity discourses (Luedike et al. 2010).  
 
Future Research Lines 
 
Whilst our theorization is particularly relevant to explain the emotionally heightened 
market conflicts that relate to broader moral or identity issues, it is certain that other 
delegitimization processes may take on different forms or unfold differently, which could be the 
case for controversies over the pragmatic legitimacy of a given consumer practice, where moral 
and identity issues may recede to the background. Furthermore, our proposed conceptualization 
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is restricted to contexts where actors publicly display their emotional accounts of opponents; as 
social media enables vilification of actors (Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchirillo 2014), our 
processual model of delegitimization is contingent on the penetration and use of social media in 
a given cultural context.  
This research opens up new questions and areas of inquiry that could be pursued by 
future research. For instance, our work focused on a case in which emotional prototyping was 
successful and consolidated as a pathic stigma. Nevertheless, future studies could focus on cases 
in which attempts at emotional vilification backfire or fail. The latter would be helpful to choose 
a more appropriate scope and better understand the conditions under which emotional 
stereotyping can be resisted and overturned by the targeted collectives.  
Furthermore, the study of emotion discourse may be fruitfully incorporated within the 
nascent literature on consumption-based offences, namely the myriad of consumption acts 
perceived by other consumers as intentionally violating some prescriptive normative standard 
(Liu et al. 2018). Whilst these authors argue that consumption-based offences are intimately 
connected to the experience of anger (Liu et al. 2018), our framework highlights the importance 
of paying closer attention to the ways in which such anger accounts are rhetorically assembled 
by the allegedly “offended consumers”, how they are mobilized in public debates and 
conversations, and the functions performed by them (e.g., blame allocation or social 
categorization).  
 
CONCLUSION 
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We conclude by noting that consumer culture is inseparable from a contemporary shift in 
the political debate and public argumentation towards a new wave of populism. The latter 
combines a heavy use of social media with a marked appeal to sentiments, particularly anger, 
resentment, and frustration, as a means to galvanize disenchanted publics. Consumer 
controversies seem to be increasingly imbued with such populist overtones. In this context, our 
work draws attention to the importance of understanding how rhetorical battles over 
consumption practices unfold as different parties compete for the moral high ground. In 
particular, we have shown how emotion discourse plays a capital role in delegitimization 
processes precisely by contributing to categorizing, stigmatizing, and dehumanizing the targeted 
collectives. As such polarizing forms of emotion discourse become normalized, especially 
through social media, there is a risk that controversies over products, brands, or consumer 
practices would increasingly turn into fertile ground for the expression of hatred, bigotry and 
prejudice. 
 
DATA COLLECTION PARAGRAPH 
 
Data from media was downloaded by the third author, helped by a Research assistant. Data from 
blogs and regulators was downloaded by the first author. The first and third author did the 
preliminary coding of data (prototypes and rhetorical strategies in challengers’, journalists’ and 
regulators’ discourses). Once the first codes were identified, the three authors refined them 
together. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Data corpus summary (news, blogs and comments) 
      News entries Blog entries Comments 
news 
Comments 
blogs 
Attack on TdV   
2014 736 23 4,171 319 
2015 1,309 19 1,227 226 
2016 (Jan-April) 93 4 1 0 
Delegitimization of TdV   
2016 (May-September)      1,506 66 1,648 245 
Total 3,644 112 7,047 790 
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Figures 
Figure 1. From emotion discourse to delegitimization 
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